Samuel Merrill, III

 
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Abstracts and Copies of Papers


Cycles in American National Electoral Politics, 1854-2006:

Statistical Evidence and an Explanatory Model

Samuel Merrill, III, Bernard Grofman, and Thomas Brunell

Forthcoming in 2008: American Political Science Review 102(1)

Abstract

Are there cycles in American politics? In particular, does the proportion of the Democratic/Republican vote share for president and/or seat share in Congress rise and fall over extended periods of time? If so, are the cycles regular, and what are the cycling periods? Moreover, if there are regular cycles, can we construct an integrated model -- such as a negative feedback loop -- that identifies political forces that could generate the observed patterns? First, we use spectral analysis to test for the presence and length of cycles, and show that regular cycles do, in fact, exist -- with periods that conform to those predicted by the Schlesingers -- for swings between liberalism and conservatism -- but with durations much shorter than those most commonly claimed by Burnham and others in characterizing American political realignments. Second, we offer a voter-party interaction model that depends on the tensions between parties≠ policy and office motivations and between voters≠ tendency to sustain incumbents while reacting against extreme policies. We find a plausible fit between the regular cycling that this model projects and the time series of two-party politics in America over the past century and a half.

Click Cycles in American Politics paper to download the above paper.

Click Cycles Web Supplement to download supplementary material cited in the text.

 


Candidate and Party Strategies in Two-Stage Elections

Beginning with a Primary

James Adams and Samuel Merrill, III

Forthcoming in 2008: American Journal of Political Science 52(April) 1-16

Abstract

In the United States and Latin America, candidates for national and state-level office frequently must win primary elections in order to advance to the general election. We model policy and valence issues for office-seeking candidates facing such two-stage elections. We determine a Nash equilibrium for the candidates≠ optimal strategies, and we find that holding a primary is likely to increase a party≠s chances of winning the general election, particularly in situations where valence issues that involve the candidates≠ campaigning skills and that are not known prior to the campaign are more salient than policy issues. Furthermore, we find that primary elections are especially likely to benefit parties that expect to be underdogs in the general election. Our conclusions are directly relevant to U.S. politics and by extension to the strategic decisions that many Latin American parties currently confront, about whether it is strategically desirable to hold primaries.

Click Primary Elections to download the above paper.

Click Primary Elections Web Supplement to download supplementary material cited in the text.

 


Policy-Seeking Parties in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation: A Valence-Uncertainty Model

James Adams and Samuel Merrill, III

Forthcoming in 2008: British Journal of Political Science

Abstract

We develop a unidimensional spatial model of multiparty parliamentary elections under Proportional Representation, in which policy-seeking parties project that the median parliamentary party will implement its policy position. We assume that the parties are uncertain about the electoral impact of valence issues, e.g. issues relating to party elites≠ images with respect to competence, integrity, and charisma. The underlying assumptions of the model, which highlight the importance of the median party in parliament, are consistent with empirical work by McDonald and Budge. Under these assumptions, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium under quite general concavity conditions and we derive a centripetal effects of valence result, that parties will slightly moderate their positions when their valence images deteriorate. We report computations of party equilibria, and we contrast our model and its implications for policy-seeking parties with results on vote-seeking parties recently reported by Schofield and Sened.

Click Valence Uncertainty under PR to download the above paper.

Click Valence Uncertainty Web Supplement to download supplementary material cited in the text.

 


Why Small, Centrist Third Parties

Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties

James Adams and Samuel Merrill, III

2006: American Political Science Review 100(3): 403-417

Abstract

Plurality-based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small, centrist, third parties. We modify the standard two-party spatial model of policy-seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party, and we show that the presence of such a party -- even if it has no chance of winning -- motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party. We derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three-party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of that equilibrium. We show that, over time, the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party. The predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar Britain.

Click Centrist Party paper to download the above paper.

Click Centrist Party Web Appendix to download simulation results for variations in the basic model.

 


The Effects of Alternative Power-sharing Arrangements: Do 'Moderating' Institutions Moderate Party Strategies and Government Policy Outputs?

Samuel Merrill, III and James Adams

2007: Public Choice 131 (June): 413-434

Abstract

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and power-sharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research -- either theoretical or empirical -- that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties' election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government.

Click Power-Sharing article to download the above paper.

Click Power-Sharing Web Appendix to download supplementary theorems and tables.

 


The Political Consequences of Alienation-Based and Indifference-Based Voter Abstention: Applications to Presidential Elections

James Adams, Jay Dow, and Samuel Merrill, III

2006: Political Behavior 28(1): 65-86

Abstract

We present a unified model of turnout and vote choice that incorporates two distinct motivations for citizens to abstain from voting: alienation from the candidates, and indifference between the candidates. The statistical model imposes an individual-level decision calculus such that the choice to abstain or turn out depends solely on the extent to which the citizen is alienated, indifferent or both. We impose this structure to better elucidate the micro-foundations of observed turnout behavior. We find that alienation and indifference both contributed substantially to the likelihood of abstention in the 1980-1988 U.S. presidential elections. We use the estimated model to address several questions including whether there is a partisan direction to changes in voter turnout rates, whether elections featuring candidates with attractive personal qualities motivate higher turnout, and whether changes in candidates' policy platforms affect the likelihood of abstention. The statistical estimates suggest that there are few significant partisan effects associated with increased voter turnout. In addition, presidential elections involving attractive candidates motivate higher turnout, but only to the extent that abstention stems from alienation rather than from indifference. Finally, while citizens' individual-level tendencies to abstain because of alienation were affected by their evaluations of the candidates' policies, aggregate turnout rates did not depend significantly on the candidates' policy platforms.

Click Abstention paper to download the above paper.


Candidates' Policy Platforms and Election Outcomes:

The Three Faces of Policy Representation

James Adams and Samuel Merrill, III

2005: European Journal of Political Research 44(6): 899-918

Abstract

Recent empirical studies by Alvarez and Nagler, Erikson and Romero, and others conclude that candidates' and parties' policy platforms only modestly affect their electoral support. This suggests that candidates/parties can win elections even when their policies differ sharply from the policy beliefs of the constituencies that elect them. This raises the question: how can voters exercise control over government policies via elections? We report applications to American and French presidential election data that suggest three, paradoxical, conclusions. On the one hand, we find that presidential candidates can moderate their policies with at most a modest change in vote share, but if they move by the same amount to a more extreme position they face severe vote losses that could cripple their election prospects. Alternatively, movement by both candidates in the same direction or a policy shift by the voters may have a major effect on the outcome.

Click Three Faces paper to download the above paper.

Click Heuristic Justification to download a theoretical analysis that suggests that candidate support curves are typically concave, at least in the center of the voter distribution.


 

Centrifugal Incentives In Multicandidate Elections

2002: Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(3):275-300

Samuel Merrill, III, and James Adams

Abstract

This paper analyzes factors that affect candidates' position-taking incentives in multicandidate and multiparty elections. Following Cox (1990), we define centrifugal incentives as those that motivate vote-seeking candidates to take more extreme positions relative to the center of the voter distribution. For a multivariate vote model that includes a Left-Right policy component, a party identification component and an unmeasured term that renders the vote choice probabilistic, we present theoretical and computer simulation results that quantify candidates' incentives to shift their policies away from the center in the direction of their partisan constituencies' mean policy preferences. Centrifugal incentives are found to increase with (1) the salience of policies and party identification, (2) the size of the candidate field, (3) the size of a candidate's partisan constituency, and (4) more extreme constituency policy preferences. Thus, ceteris paribus, candidates who represent large constituencies are motivated to present more extreme policies than are candidates who represent small ones.

Click Centrifugal to download the above paper.


 

Computing Nash Equilibria in Probabilistic, Multiparty Spatial Models with Nonpolicy Components

2001. Political Analysis 9: 347-361

Samuel Merrill, III, and James Adams

Abstract

Although there exist extensive results concerning equilibria in spatial models of two-party elections with probabilistic voting, we know far less about equilibria in multiparty elections -- i.e., under what conditions will equilibria exist, and what are the characteristics of equilibrium configurations? We develop an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in multiparty elections with probabilistic voting, in which voters choose according to the behaviorists' fully specified multivariate vote model. Previously, such computations could only be approximated by laborious search methods. The algorithm, which assumes a conditional logit choice function, can be applied to spatial competition for a variety of party objectives including vote-maximization and margin-maximization, and can also encompass alternative voter policy metrics such as quadratic and linear loss functions. We derive conditions that guarantee that the algorithm will converge to a unique Nash equilibrium, and show that these conditions are plausible given the empirically-estimated parameters that behaviorists report for voting behavior in historical elections. We also show that parties' equilibrium positions depend not only on the distribution of voters' policy preferences but also on their nonpolicy-related attributes such as partisanship and sociodemographic variables. Empirical applications to data from the 1988 French Presidential Election illustrate the use of the algorithm.

Click Nash equilibrium paper to download the above paper.

 

 

Appendices to the Nash equilibrium paper not included in the published version are available in the Word document: Appendices to Algorithm paper.

Voter Turnout and Candidate Strategies in American Elections

2003. Journal of Politics 65(1): 161-189

James Adams and Samuel Merrill, III

Abstract

Most spatial models of two-candidate competition imply that candidates have electoral incentives to present similar, centrist policies. We modify the standard Downsian model to include three observations supported by empirical research on American elections: that voters are prepared to abstain if neither competitor is sufficiently attractive (abstention due to alienation) or if the candidates are insufficiently differentiated (abstention due to indifference); that voters are influenced by factors such as education, race, and partisanship, that are not directly tied to the candidates' positions in the current campaign; and that voters' nonpolicy characteristics correlate with their policy preferences. We argue that all these conditions (except indifference) motivate vote-seeking candidates to present divergent policies that reflect the beliefs of voters biased towards them for nonpolicy reasons. We support our argument with applications to ANES data which suggest that in the 1988 presidential election, both the Democratic candidate Dukakis and the Republican Bush had electoral motivations to present policies that reflected the beliefs of their partisan constituencies, and that the threat of abstention due to alienation is crucial to that conclusion.

Our results suggest that voters' turnout decisions and their nonpolicy characteristics, even if the candidates in the course of a campaign cannot manipulate the latter, are nonetheless necessary for understanding candidates' policy strategies. Our conclusions have additional implications for the strategies candidates may feasibly employ when they pursue policy objectives other than maximizing support in the general election, such as achieving policy objectives or maximizing their joint probabilities of winning both the primary and the general election.


Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Voter Projections of Party Locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and the USA

2001. European Journal of Political Research 40: 199-221

Samuel Merrill, III, Bernard Grofman, and James Adams

ABSTRACT

In the standard Downsian model, voters are assumed to choose parties based on the extent of ideological proximity between the voter's own position and that of the party. Yet it is also well known that there are rationalization and projection effects such that voters tend to misestimate the policy platforms of candidates or parties to which they are sympathetic by overstating the correspondence between those positions and the voter's own preferences (see e.g., Markus and Converse, 1979; Granberg and Brent, 1980; Granberg and Holmberg, 1988; Merrill and Grofman, 1999). Here we follow insights in the psychological literature on persuasion (Sherif and Hovland, 1961; Parducci and Marshall, 1962) by distinguishing between assimilation and contrast effects. Assimilation refers to shortening the perceived ideological distance between oneself and parties whom one favors; contrast refers to exaggerating the distance to parties for whom one does not intend to vote. Using survey data on voter self-placements and party placements on ideological scales for the seven major Norwegian parties (1989), five major French parties (1988), and two major American parties (1984, 1988, 1992) we show that both assimilation and contrast effects are present in each country to a considerable degree. We also investigate the possible effects of randomness in party placement and scale interpretation - effects that can easily be confounded with assimilation but not so easily with contrast.

Click Assimilation to download the above paper.


Ecological Regression and Ecological Inference

Bernard Grofman

Samuel Merrill

In Ecological Inference, eds. Gary King, Ori Rosen, and Martin Tanner. 2004. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 123-143.

Adapted from a presentation at the Ecological Inference Conference, June 17-18, 2002, at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

ABSTRACT

In ecological inference we seek to make use of data that is aggregated at the level of ecological units to make inferences about the behavior of individual actors. The ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950) occurs when relationships between variables that obtain at the aggregate level are not found at the individual level (or conversely). Our primary focus in this paper is on proposing three "new" methods of ecological inference that are more "quick and dirty" in nature than the sophisticated statistical models offered by King and his colleagues. King's estimates the unknown parameters of interest using MLE methods on a truncated bivariate normal or Beta distribution overlaid on the tomographic plot lines in (b b, b w) phase space. The simplest of the three methods we offer replaces this MLE approach with a simple squared distance minimization algorithm on the tomographic plot lines. Specifically, for the district level solution, we choose that point on the district tomographic segment that minimizes the (weighted) sum of the squared distances to the tomographic line segments for the precincts. Suppose, for example, our problem is to estimate the proportions of blacks and whites who voted for a black candidate. These distances can be interpreted as the weighted differences between the proportion of voters for the black candidate in the ith precinct and what that proportion would be if the proportions voting for the black candidate broken down by race were the same as in the district as a whole. The precinct-level estimates for the parameters of interest are then obtained as the nearest point on the precinct tomographic line segment to the district solution. The analytic solution we obtain from this method is very similar in structure to that of the usual regression model -- but unlike regression -- our approach guarantees feasible solutions at both the precinct and district level.

The second and third methods we propose can each be thought of as forms of "constrained" Goodman ecological regression. The first of these latter methods generates a distance minimization in () phase space (where m and b are the slope and intercept of possible regression lines) rather than in () phase space. The latter operates in the original (x, y) space and finds the regression line that minimizes the sum of the areas between it and pairs of constraint lines segments that are generated by a variant of the Duncan-Davis method of bounds.

These methods demonstrate that the contrast between ecological regression in the form proposed by Goodman (1953, 1959) and ecological inference of the sort described in King (1997) is too easily exaggerated. Two of the three methods produce results that are, in general, very close to those produced by King's algorithms. Each uses either King's extension of the Davis-Duncan (1953) method of bounds or a simple variant thereof. Each operates without any assumptions about the distribution of parameters; but bootstrap standard errors can be obtained to assess the results.

Click Ecological Inference to download the above paper.

To download a Excel program to use the computational methods, click on

EI_GM_Model_1_11

EI_GM_Model_3_11

EI_GM_Model_1_Cleo

For a companion article investigating criteria for specifying a solution to the problem of ecological inference, select Criteria. See below for the title and abstract of this article.

What Does it Mean to Offer a 'Solution' to the Problem of Ecological Inference?

Bernard Grofman

Samuel Merrill

Adapted from a presentation at the Ecological Inference Conference, June 17-18, 2002, at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

ABSTRACT

We consider the general characteristics of "solutions" to the problem of making reliable ecological inferences in terms of eleven features: feasibility, completeness, coherence, sensitivity, substantive plausibility, parsimony, replicability, characterizability, diagnosticability, expansibility, explainability and calculability. We show that the family of methods in King (1997) and King et al. (1999) score high on all but one of these counts. However, our methods also score equally high on most features, and are also very easy to estimate using just an EXCEL spreadsheet.





Last update: Wednesday, February 13, 2008 at 1:32:22 PM.